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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. BACKMAN,
a Taxpayer for himself and for all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUN,TY,
a body corporate and politic,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 9697

RESPONDEN'T'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Statement of facts by appellant is not contested.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CASE OF LEHI 'CITY V. MElLING MAY NOT BE
CONTROLLING.
1

In the case of Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 U. 237, 48
P.2d 530, the Metropolitan Water District Act, Title 73,
Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953 was held constitutional. The Civic Auditorium Act, Title 11, Chapter
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11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was patterned upon the
water district act.

We shall refer hereafter to the above case as the
Lehi case. 'The decision was a three to two decision. The
Justices gave opinions as follows: Folland's majority
opinion was concurred in by Hansen only. \Volfe concurred specially. Moffat dissented and Hanson concurred
with the dissent.
The fact that it was a split decision; the fact that
none of those Justices is presently on the bench and
the fact that some of the reasons given in the majority
and specially concurring opinions are inapplicable to the
civic auditorium, make the controlling effect of the Lehi
case questionable. Other reasons why the LehiJ case n1ay
not control are as follows:
Some questions raised in this case were not decided
by the Lehi case, either because they were not raised
as issues, or because such issues were not present because
of significant differences between the two acts, which
differences are hereafter discussed.
The majority opinion in the Lehi case stressed the
fact that water is of tremendous importance to the
political bodies in the State of Utah, and there may have
been an element of necessity in the reasoning behind the
decision in the Lehi case, causing the court to disregard constitutional objections because of the paramount
nece,ssity of obtaining water. Such compelling need is
not present in this civic auditorium case.
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The cities in the Lehi case could not obtain water
without combining their efforts, and did not have the
power to combine their efforts without a water district,
whereas, in this case, the civic auditorium district area
is coterminous with that of the county, and the county
(except for a constitutional debt limit) could accomplish
what any civic auditorium district could acomplish.
POINT II.
IF THE DISTRICT IS A SPECIAL COMMISSION, PRIVATE CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION, THE ~CT WOULD
VIOLATE ARTICLE 6, SECTION 29, OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION. (APPELLANT'S POINT 1.)

Artile 6, Section 29 provide'S :

"The legislature shall not delegate to any special commission, p·rivate corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or imterfere
with any municipal ~'mprovement, money, property
or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to
levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform
any munict"pal funct~ons."
The act provides the district is authorized to :
(a) J\tlake, construct and supervise a civic auditorium
(which is a "municipal improvement") (11-11-2, 11-11-13).
(b) Control money for and from the operation thereof (so the district "supervises money") (11-11-13).
(c) Levy taxes (11-11-13).
All of these are activities under this section. The question to be resolved therefore, is whether or not the delegation of the above powers is a delegation to a "special
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cornmission, private corporation or association." Factors
indicating the district does come under such classification are as follows:
(a) The board is not elected but is rather appointed
to office (11-11-15).
(b) :Members of the board need not be residents of
either the city they represent or of the district (11-1115).
· (c) The members of the board are responsible to no
one, neither the persons who appointed them nor the
voters of the district, and continue in office indefinitely
(11-11-15 ).

In Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72
Utah 536, 271 P. 961, it was held that the Public Utilities
Commission could not regulate the rate to be charged
by Logan City for electricity furnished by a city owned
plant. The court said, in discussing Article 6, Section 29:
"We think it clear that the undoubted purpose of the constitutional provision is to hold inviolate the right of local self-government of cities
and towns with respect to municipal improvements, money, property, effects, the le;vying of
taxes, and the performance of municipal functions. Stress, however, is laid on the words in
the section of the Constitution, 'special commission,' that the power shall not be delegated to a
special commission, and that the Public Utilities
Commission is a general and not a special commission, and hence whateve·r power may have been
delegated to the commission in such respect is
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not in violation of such constitutional provision,
to support which the case of Public Serv;ice Commission v. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 P. 24
is especially cited. That case so holds. But we
think such a construction of the section is too narrow, and one which in effect impairs the very
essence and purpose of it, deprives cities and
towns oi local self-government, and interferes
with their power to levy taxes and in the performance of their municipal corporate affairs with
respect to tl1eir improvements, property and municipal functions. Town of Holyoke v. Sm~th, 75
Colo. 286, 226 P. 159."
In a concurring opinion the following was said:
"That the people of Utah, when they adopted
section 29 of article 6 of the state· Constitution,
intended to limit the power of the legislative
branch of government, so as to prevent the delegation of the power to perform municipal functions, or the power to supervise or interfere with
municipal property, to any commission outside the
municipal fold, and that they thereby manifest
an intention, which must be respected by the
courts, that municipal property shall remain under the supervision and control of, and municipal
functions shall be per£ormed by, municipal officials, who are amenable to the will of the inhabitants of the municipalities, so long as municipal
corporations continue to exist and that section
remains a part of the fundamental law, are propositions about the soundness of which I have no
doubt."
In the Lehi case (supra) the question as to whether
or not the district was 'a "special commission" was raised.
·The majority opinion (p. 535) gave no reason hut merely
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said the district was not a "special cmnmission". ::Jlr.
Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion (p. 547), looked
at the function of the district to determine if the district
was a "special commission", and said that the definition
of ''special commission"
"may therefore take content, not so much from
its intrinsic meaning,, as from the nature and
powers of the duties which are given to it. But
a Metropolitan \Vater District appears to he designed not to interfere with municipal affairs but
as a me.ans to further them."
He went on to conclude that since the immense water projects were not within the capabilities of cities, they were
therefore not municipal functions and consquently a
district is not a ''special commission." Although Judge
Wolfe's reasoning is hard to follow, inasmuch as he
seems to be confusing the definition of "special commission" with the acts done by such commision, both of
which are covered by this constitutional section, it is
apparent that had the water projects been of such size
that the combined efforts of cities was not necessary,
Judge Wolfe would have held that the act violated this
section of the constitution. In the subsequent case of
Provo City v. Evans, 87 Utah 292, 48 P.2d 555, where
only one city was involved in a district, and therefore
there could be no combined efforts of cities, Judge Wolfe
relied on the necessity of combined efforts of water districts. Again the combined efforts of political bodies
was the basis of his decision. No such combined efforts
are contemplated by the auditorium act and therefore
1
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the reasoning of Judge Wolfe's concurring opinion, which
made the majority opinion the majority rather than the
minority opinion, is inapplicable here.
POINT III.
IF THE DISTRI,CT IS NOT A "SPECIAL COMMISSION"
THEN IT MUST BE A MUNICIPAL COR,PORATION, OTHER,..
WISE ARTICLE 13, SECTION 5, OF THE CONSTITUTION
]S VIOLATED. (APPELLANT'S POINT VII.)

Article 13, Section 5, provides :
''The Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or other
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in
the corporate. authorities thereof, respectively, the
power to ,assess and collect t,axes for all purposes
of such corporation."
This section allows the powers of taxation to be
exercised only by certain bodies. The only classification,
under which the water district could fall is the classification of municipal corporation. In order to exercise the
powers of taxation it must be a municipal corporation.
If it is a municipal corporation, then the debt limitation
of a municipal corporation set out under Article 14, Sections 3 and 4 discussed in Point V, would be violated.
Furthermore, the levying of taxes for county purposes is limited by this constitutional provision to the
corporate authorities of the county as pointed out in
State vs. Standford, 24 U. 148, 66 P. 1061, 1064, wherein
the ·Court said:
"Under the Constitution the state has no
power to make a disposition of county funds, and
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require that they be appropriated for other and
different purposes than those for which by authority of the county they were collected. San Luis
Obispo Co. v. Graves, 84 Cal. 71, 23 Pac. 1032.
In our opinion section 5, art. 13, of the Constitution, not only limits local or county taxation to
local county purposes, but it was also intended
as a limitation upon the power of the legislature
to grant the right or impose the duty of creating
a debt or levying .a tax to any person or body other
than the corporate authorities of the county."
The building :and operation of a civic auditorium is
a municipal function which the county itself, except for
the debt limitation of the constitution, could undertake
without the creation of a separate district. The building
and operation of an auditorium is a local county purpose
for which the county authorities alone are authorized
to levy taxes, under the above construction.
POINT IV.
A SPE'CIAL LAW WOULD VIOLATE ARTICLE 11, SECTION 5, ARTICLE 6, SECTION 26 AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 24 OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION. (APPELLANT'S
POINTS II AND X.)

Said Sections provide in part :
Article 1, Section 24 :
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."
Article 6, Section 26 :
''The Legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or special laws in the following cru:;es:
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"11. Regulating county and township affairs ...
"16. Granting to an individual, association
or corporation any privilege, immunity or franchise ...
"In all cases where a general law can be
applicable, no special law shall be enacted . "
Article 11, Section 5 :
'• Corporations for municipal purposes shall
not be created by special laws . . ."
The act is a special law in that it applies only to
counties having a population in excess of 250,000 and
thus does not have general application (11-11-2, 11-113). The only county to which it is presently applicable
is Salt Lake County. Had the act allowed every county
within the state to create such districts, it may then have
been a general law with a specific purpos·e instead of a
special law with a special or specific purpose. In Lehi
City vs. Mdling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530, 547, Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion, said:
"·The Legislature could not pass an act specifically directed at Salt Lake City or some other
particular municipality."
In State vs. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 898
the Court said :
''As pointed out in that case, our statute re.quires that all laws shall operate uniformly wherever uniform laws can be enacted. While it is
true that this court, in common with others, has
repeatedly held that legislative subjects may be
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classified and that legislative classification should
not be interferred with by the courts unless such
classification is clearly fanciful, capricious, arbitrary, or unnatural, yet, where such is the case,
it becomes the duty of the courts to uphold the
constitutional rights and privileges in that regard."
Evidently the support of legislators representing
sparsely populated counties was obtained by placing
the population limitation therein so that if Salt Lake
County wants an auditorium, it can have it, without any
effect on the other counties.
If the act providing for construction and operation
of a civic auditorium is of a general nature, then Article
1, Section 24 is violated.
If the financing, construction and operation of a
civic auditorium is a municipal purpose, then Article
11, Section 5 is violated.
If the civic auditorium is a county affair, then Article 6, Section 26 (11) is violated.
If the civic auditorium is neither a municipal purpose
nor a county affair, then Article 6, Section 26 (16) is
violated because a franchise is given.
Regardless of whether a civic auditorium is a municipal purpose, a county affair or whether or not a franchise was granted, there is an over-all prohibition of a
special law when ''a general law can be applicable". Certainly the Legislature could have had a general law applicable to counties regardless of population.
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In State vs. Standford, 24 U. 148, 66 P. 1061, 1064
an act providing for agricultural inspectors for counties
having 5,000 or more fruit trees and further providing
that in counties having a population of over 20,000 deputies could be appointed, it was held that the act w.as
unconstitutional because it did not have uniform operation throughout the state. The Court said:
''The state legislature is forbidden to pass
any private or special laws regUlating county affairs. The laws enacted must be uniform generally, and applicable to all of the counties throughout the state. In Welsh v. Bramlet, supr.a, it is
said: 'Whenever it attempts to enact a law for one
or more of the counties of the state upon subjects
that it is directed to provide for by general laws,
or which are to form part of a uniform system
for the whole state, whethe:r such counties are
designated directly by name, or by reference to
a class into which they have be·en placed for other
subjects of legislation, it infringes these provisions of the constitution. We must. take judicial
knowledge that there is only one county in the
state whose population places it in the eighth
class, and, if an act is passed by the legislature
that is applicable to only one county in the state,
it does not cease to be local by reason of the fact
that it purports to be applicable to a class of counties which the legislature is not authorized to
create for the purpose of such legislation, and of
which that county constitutes the only member.' "
Although the Lehi case (supra) discussed whether
or not the act was a "special law," there was no population requirement for the creation of a water district
and therefore the Lehi case is not applicable here, except
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that the following language from the majority opinion
(p. 536) indicates that the decision might have been different had the act not applied to all counties. The Court
said:
''The act is not limited to any particular cities
or towns, or to .any particular locality in the state,
but it operates uniformly on every city or town
which may choose to truke advantage of its provisions. In form, as well as in substance, it is a general law and not special."
POINT V.
THE 10% DEBT LIMITATION WOULD VIOLATE ARTICLE 14, SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION. (APPELLANT'S POINT III.)

Said sections provide, in part, as follows :
"Sec. 3. No debt in excess of the taxes for
the current year shall be created by any county
or subdivis~on thereof, or by any school district
therein, or by any city, town or village, or any subdivision thereof in this state; unless the proposition to create such debt, shall have been submitted
to a vote of such qualified electors as shall have
paid a property tax therein, in the year preceding
such election, and a majority of those voting thereon shall have voted in favor of incurring such
debt. 11
"Sec. 4. When authorized to create tndebte.dnes as provided in Section 3 of this Article, no
county shall become indebted to an amount, includivng exist.ing indebtedness exceeding two percentum. No city, town, school district or other
municipal corporation, shall become indebted to
an amount, including existing indebtedness, ex-
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ceeding fou.r per centum of the value of the taxable property therein . . ."

The act provides for a limitation on the district debt
(not including any county debt) of 10% (11-11-13(6) ).
District areas coincide with county areas (11-11-3).
If the Legislature, by the mere subterfuge of saying that
the county constitutes a district, can avoid the 2% limitation of indebtedness upon counties, then the above sections are emasculated. The Legislature could then declare that the county constituted any number of districts
and thereby create ·enough taxing units that the result
could be any amount of indebtedness even up to 100%.
If these constitutional sections are given effect, the total
of authorized indebtedness of the county and any district which is coterminous with the county should not
exceed 2%.
Furthermore, if it be determined as discussed under
Point I that the district is a municipal corporation (instead of a special commission, private corporation or
association) then the 4% limitation would be applicable.
Such a 4% limitation would be violated by (11-11-13(6) )
permitting indebtedness up to 10%.
The majority opinion in the Lehi case (supra) (p.
541) solved this problem by the simple expedient of declaring that a district was a "quasi municipal" body. The
decision then reasoned that it has some attributes of a
municipal corporation but does not have to comply with
the limitations placed by the constitution on such cor-
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porations. The concurring opinion of Judge Wolfe (p.
549) concludes that the function of the district is proprietary, not governmental. He somehow concludes therefrom that this takes the district out of the classification
of a "municipal corporation". The dissent (p. 553) logieally argues that:
"The ·Constitution of Utah provides for the
organization, management, and operation of two
classes of corporations, viz., municipal corporations, and private corporations. For the Legislature or the courts by supplying a different adjective modifier to the word 'corporation,' and
thereby bringing about a new hybrid entity that
is neither municipal nor private within the purview of the terms of the Utah Constitution, appeals as a refinement. It is an easy method to
avoid the plan terms of the State Constitution.
If constitutional limitations may thus by a process of definition be eliminated, evaded, or evaporated out of the Constitution, the stabilizing
purposes and restraints of Constitutions intended
to tide the people over periods of emergency, excitement, or trouble until calm reflection may
analyze· and measure the needs, will cease to accomplish the purposes for which they are intended."
POINT VI.
THE CREATION OF A TAXING UNIT WITH LITTLE
NOTICE MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7, OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
(APPELLANT'S POINT IV.)

·Article 1, Section 7, of the State Constitution provides:
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"Sec. 7. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the ·Constitution of
the United States provides, in part:
•'No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ... "
The provisions as to notice for the holding of the
first election are that a notice ''shall be published once
at least ten days before the date of the election ... and
no other or further notice of such election ... or polling
places need be given or made" (11-11-6).
Furthermore, the above provision for notiee (11-116) is ambiguous in that it says that notice shall be "published in each county within the proposed Civic Auditorium and Sports Arena District" implying that there
may be more than one county.
The provision for notice of the election on the proposition of bonded indebtedness is similar. It provides for
one publication ten days before the election or, if there
is no newspaper, posting in three public places at least
ten days before the election (11-11-18).
If such publication is inadequate either as to time
or manner of giving notice, then the act would be unconstitutional.
A similar provision as to notice was held constitutional in the Lehi case (supra), however.
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POINT VII
A THREE MONTH LIMITATION PERIOD MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SE·CTION 7, OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTTT'UTION OF THE UNITED STATE1S. (APPELLANT'S
POINT V.)

The Constitutional provisions are set out in Point

IV.
Section 11-11-12 of the Act provides, in part:
"The validity of the incorporation of any
such district shall be incontestable in any suit or
proceeding which shall not have been commenced
within three months from the date of issuance of
the certificate of incorporation thereof; . . ."
If a three month limitation is an unreasonably short
period, then the provision would be unconstitutional.
The cases as to reasonableness of the period of time
are many and varied as to time limitations which have
been approved or disapproved, but a three month period
is about the minimum time which decisions have upheld.
34 Amerioan Jurispntdence, Limitation of Actions, Pars.
25, 26.
This question was not raised in the Lehi case
(supra).
POINT VIII.
MANNER OF HOLDING ELECTIONS MAY VIOLA'TE ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2, OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION. (APPELLANT',S POINT VI.)
TH~

Article 1, Section 2, provides :
''Sec. 2. All political power is inherent in
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the people; and all free governments are founded
on their authority for their equal protection and
benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform
their government as the public welfare may require."
·The act provides for the voting on the creation of
a district during a municipal election (11-11-3). It provides for elections in years in which there is a municipal
election and not an election in the unincorporated areas
of the county, thereby creating a likelihood that a greater
percentage of residents in incorpoi"ated areas of the county will vote on the matter of a municipal auditorium,
because they will be at the polls for various matters in
which they have an interest. 'This is particularly true in
view of the fact that elections in the unincorporated areas
of the county probably would be conducted in a consolidated district, which would reduce the number of voters.
This question was not raised in the Lehi case
(supra).
POINT IX.
EXEMPTION OF AN AUDITORIUM FROM TAXATION
MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE 13, SECTION 10, OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION. (APPELLANT'S POINT VIII.)

Said section provide's :
"Sec. 10. All corporations or persons in this
State, or doing business herein, shall be subject
to taxation for State, County, School, Municipal
or other purposes, on the real .and personal property owned or used by them within the Territorial
li1nits of the authority levying the tax."
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Although there is no specific exemption in the act, it
is apparent that the act contemplates that the auditorium
will not be subject to property tax. If the district is not
subject to the debt limitation of a municipal corporation
(Point V), then a property tax exemption for the auditorium would violate the above section of the constitution.
This question was not raised in the Lehi case
(supra).
POINT X.
SOME PROVISIONS OF THE ACT ARE NOT ·CLEARLY
EXPRESSED IN 'THE TITLE WHICH MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE 6, SECTION 23, OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION.
(APPELLANT'S POINT IX.)

Said section provides :
"Sec. 23. Except general appropriation bills,
and bills for the codification and general revision
of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed
in its title."
The title of the act is as follows
"TITLE OF ACT.

"An act providing for the incorporation,
government and management of civic auditorium
and sports arena districts, authorizing such district to incur bonded debt and to acquire,
construct, operate and manage properties and
facilities for sports events, conventions, cultural
exhibits and shows, public meetings ;and other
similar purposes; providing for the taxation of
property therein and the performance of certain
functions relating thereto by officers of cities of
the first class or counties."
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The above title does not include the subject matter
contained within two sections providing for actions to
determine the validity of bonds, etc., and providing that
bonds shall be legal investments, and valid security.
·The headings of the two sections are as follows:
"11-11-25. A!CTION TO DE. TERMINE
VALIDITY OF BONDS, CONTRACTS, CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS, OR IND·EBTEDNESS
OR SUFFICIENCY OF PROVISIONS FOR
ANNUAL T'AX - JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT - JUDGMEN'T- APPEALPROCEDURE - COSTS."
"11-11-29. BONDS TO BE LEGAL INVEST'MEN·TS - USE AS SECURITY FOR
FAITHFUL PERFORMANCE OF ACTS."
This question was not raised in the Lehi case
(supra).
POINT XI.
THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE COUNTY CALL AN
ELE.CTION MAY VIOLATE ARTICLE 6, SECTION 26(11)
AND ARTICLE 13, SECTION 5, OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION.

Article 6, Section 26 (11) provides as follows :
''·The legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or special laws in the following cases:
... 11. Regulating county and township affairs."
Article 13, Section 5, provides as follows:
"The Legislature shall not impose taxes for
the purpose of any county, city, town or other
municipal corpor.ation, but may, by law, vest in
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the corporate authorities thereof, respectively,
the power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation."
The act provides that an "election shall be called by
ordinance by the governing body of each county affected". (11-11-4)
This is a regulation of county affairs which is valid
only if the act is a general act applicable to all counties
and not a special act.
The requirement that an election be called, with the
incident requirement of expenditure of funds therefor
by the county is a determination by the legislature of
the disposition of county funds which the court said was
improper in State v. StandfO'r.d 24 U. 148, 66 P. 1061,
1064 wherein the court said :
". . . Nor can the state compel a county to
incur .a debt or to levy a tax for the purpose named
in the act without its consent."
There was no such r.equirement that the county call
an election in the Lehi case supra).
POINT XII.
THE ACT HAS NO SAVINGS CLAUSE.

There is no savings clause in the act providing that
if part is held unconstitutional the re1nainder shall be
deemed valid.
POINT XIII.
THE ACT IS VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS. (APPELLANT'S POINT XI.)
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(a) The act does not provide for the payment of
expenses of a special election to be called for incorporation of the district (11-11-3) nor who shall bear the expense of the election and notice thereof if held with the
general election (11-11-5, 11-11-6) nor who shall bear the
expense of the election on the proposition of incurring
indebtedness (11-11-18) after a district is formed. The
latter situation would pose a particularly difficult problem if at the election on the proposition of incurring
indebtedness a negative vote resulted.
If the county has to bear the expense of any of the
elections, this may be unconstitutional as pointed out
under Point IX.
(b) Section 3 of said act provides that an election
to determine whether said districts should be incorporated shall be called "at the next succeeding Municipal
Election following the passage of this act". Salt Lake
County refused to call such election and no such election
occurred at the next succeeding municipal election, hut
Salt Lake County has now called an election thereon at
the next general election. Said act is not clear as to
whether the election can properly be called at tlie next
succeeding general election or whether it should be called
at the next succeeding municipal election, or whether an
election can be called at all.
(c) Section 11-11-31 requires the levy of taxes sufficent to meet interest and sinking fund requirements.
This conflicts with Section 11-11-13(7) which limits the
amount of taxes.
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(d) Various sections imply that a district may constitute more than one county (11-11-6, 11-11-32), whereas
11-11-2 provides that one county shall constitute a
district.
(e) 11-11-15 provides for a board of nine members,
three of whom shall be appointed by the city of the first
class. If there is no city of the first class, there is no
provision as to the size of the board.
CONCLUSION
The most difficult constitutional problems appear to
be the following:
The district may be a "special commission" in which
event, since it has the power to tax, it has unconstitutional
powers.
The district would have constitutional powers to tax
only if classified as a "municipal corporation''. A municipal corporation has a limitation of a debt of 4% which
this act exceeds.
The auditorium district is coterminous with the
county area, and the creation of a separate political body
with power to levy taxes for the construction of a municipal building, seems to be a subterfuge whereby the
county's 2% debt limitation is ignored.
~The

act applies only to counties of 250,000 in population. There is no reason to discriminate against smaller
counties which might want the same power to go above
their debt limit that Salt La:ke 'County thereby obtains.
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Other counties may be also interested in tourism and conventions even though they are not so populous as Salt
Lake County. The act is therefore a special act without
uniform operation.
A county with the necessary population is required,
rather than authorized, to hold an election to determine
whether a district shall be created. This is a regulation
of county affairs and is a requirement that a particular
county spend its taxes for an election.
rrhe levying of taxes by Salt Lake County for the
construction and operation of a municipal building should
be a matter for county determination and control rather
than for determination and control by an independent
political body.
The title of the act does not refer to the validity of
bonds nor the use that can be made of them.
The act is vague.
The act if constitutional should be construed as to
various vague portions thereof.
Respectfully submitted,
Brayton, Lowe & Hurley
Frank E. Diston
John W. Lowe
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